On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs

Judith Timmer (j.b.timmer@ewi.utwente.nl), Peter Borm and Stef Tijs

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 595-613

Abstract: Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that the equivalence is not preserved since these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and a characterization on a subclass of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Cooperative games; Random variables; Shapley value; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400181

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