An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria

Srihari Govindan and Jean-François Mertens

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 3, 339-357

Abstract: Characterisations of stable equilibria in terms of the best reply correspondence are given. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Game; Non-Cooperative; N-Person; Equilibria; Refinements; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400165

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