Fictitious play in coordination games

Aner Sela and Dorothea Herreiner

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 189-197

Abstract: We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with bounded recall. In particular, this implies that a FP player's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his minmax payoff in 2þ2 coordination games.

Keywords: Learning; ·; fictitious; play; ·; (pure); coordination; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-17
Note: Received: December 1997/Final version: November 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/9028002/90280189.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:189-197

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().