Population monotonic solutions on convex games

Toru Hokari ()
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Toru Hokari: Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, JAPAN

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 3, 327-338

Abstract: The Dutta-Ray solution and the Shapley value are two well-known examples of population-monotonic solutions on the domain of convex games. We provide a new formula for the Dutta-Ray solution from which population-monotonicity immediately follows. Then we define a new family of population-monotonic solutions, which we refer to as "sequential Dutta-Ray solutions." We also show that it is possible to construct several symmetric and population-monotonic solutions by using the solutions in this family.

Keywords: Population monotonicity; convex games; the Dutta-Ray solution; the Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-11
Note: Received September 1998/Revised version: December 1999
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