Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility
Johan Karlander () and
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Johan Karlander: Nada, KTH, SE-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 29, issue 4, 555-569
We consider the TU version of Gale and Shapley's roommate game. We find several results that are analogous to known results for the NTU game, such as a characterization of stable outcomes by forbidden minors, a characterization of the extreme points of the core, and a median property of stable outcomes. The TU roommate game is a special case of the TU partitioning game of Kaneko and Wooders. Bondareva and Shapley's balancedness condition for the core of such games is the starting point for our forbidden minors approach.
Keywords: roommate; problem; ·; partitioning; game; ·; transferable; utility; ·; core; ·; forbidden; minors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received: April 1999/Revised version: November 2000
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