Replication invariance on NTU games
Emilio Calvo (),
Iñaki Garci´a () and
José Zarzuelo ()
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Iñaki Garci´a: Dpto. Análisis Económico, Universidad de Valencia, Campus dels Tarongers, Avinguda dels Tarongers, s/n. Edificio Departamental Oriental, 46022 Valencia, Spain
International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 29, issue 4, 473-486
Two concepts of replication (conflictual and non-conflictual) are extended from the class of pure bargaining games to the class of NTU games. The behavior of the Harsanyi, Shapley NTU, Egalitarian and Maschler-Owen solutions of the replica games is compared with that of the Nash and Egalitarian solutions in pure bargaining games.
Keywords: NTU; games; ·; NTU; solutions; ·; replication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received June 1995/Final version February 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:473-486
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