Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies

Anton Stefanescu ()
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Anton Stefanescu: University of Bucharest, Faculty of Mathematics, 14 Academiei st, Bucharest 70109

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 3, 412 pages

Abstract: Uniform competitive solutions are stable configurations of proposals predicting coalition formation and effective payoffs. Such "solutions" exist for almost all properly defined cooperative games and, therefore, can be proposed as substitute of the core. The new existence results obtained in the present paper concern also the case when the coalitional function of a game has empty values. All concepts and results are implemented in the competitive analysis of the exchange economies.

Keywords: cooperative games; core; competitive solutions; exchange economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-11
Note: Received: July 1997/Final version: February 2000
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