Stability in coalition formation games

Antonio Romero-Medina () and Katari´na Cechlárová ()
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Antonio Romero-Medina: Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III, 28903 Getafe, Spain
Katari´na Cechlárová: Department of Geometry and Algebra, P. J. Safárik University, Jesenná 5, 041 54 Kosice, Slovakia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 29, issue 4, 487-494

Abstract: In the context of coalition formation games a player evaluates a partition on the basis of the set she belongs to. For this evaluation to be possible, players are supposed to have preferences over sets to which they could belong. In this paper, we suggest two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets. For the first one, derived from the most preferred member of a set, it is shown that a strict core partition always exists if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for the computation of one strict core partition is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least preferred member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roommates problem.

Keywords: Coalition; formation; games; ·; core; ·; stable; roommates; problem; ·; digraphs; ·; algorithms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05-04
Note: Received August 1998/Final version June 20, 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Working Paper: Stability in one-sided matching markets (1998)
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