Stability in one-sided matching markets

Katarína Cechlárová
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation, when it is allowed to form groups of any size (the stable partition problem). Two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets are suggested. For the first one, derived from the most prefered member of a set, it is shown that a stable partition always existis if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for its computation is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least prefered member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roornmates problem.

Keywords: Matching; markets; Stable; partition; Digraphs; Algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-07
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 0b50181b6ce3/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stability in coalition formation games (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:4158

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().