A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives

Edward M. Bolger ()
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Edward M. Bolger: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 45056, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 93-99

Abstract: In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player's "a priori" value in such a game. In this paper, we show that the value has a consistency property similar to the "consistency" for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.

Date: 2000-02-15
Note: Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999
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