Correlated equilibria of games with many players

Hans Keiding and Bezalel Peleg
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Hans Keiding: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark.

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 3, 375-389

Abstract: Let Gm,n be the class of strategic games with n players, where each player has m\geq2 pure strategies. We are interested in the structure of the set of correlated equilibria of games in Gm,n when n ->\infty. As the number of equilibrium constraints grows slower than the number of pure strategy profiles, it might be conjectured that the set of correlated equilibria becomes large. In this paper, we show that (1) the average relative measure of the set of correlated equilibria is smaller than 2-n; and (2) for each 1

Keywords: correlated equilibrium; large games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-11
Note: Received: December 1998/Final version: March 2000
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