note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games

Toru Hokari ()
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Toru Hokari: Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 133-137

Abstract: We show that the nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games, and that this lack of monotonicity holds even if there are as few as four agents.

Keywords: Nucleolus; convex games; aggregate-monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-15
Note: Received May 1999/Revised version December 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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