note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power

Mehmet Bac

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 119-126

Abstract: Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable.

Keywords: Alternating offers bargaining; incomplete information; sequential equilibrium; delay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-15
Note: Received: July 1996/Final version: August 1999
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