Weighted nucleoli

Hans Haller () and Jean Derks
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Hans Haller: Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061-0316, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 173-187

Abstract: Cooperative games in characteristic function form (TU games) are considered. We allow for variable populations or carriers. Weighted nucleoli are defined via weighted excesses for coalitions. A solution satisfies the Null Player Out (NPO) property, if elimination of a null player does not affect the payoffs of the other players. For any single-valued and efficient solution, the NPO property implies the null player property. We show that a weighted nucleolus has the null player property if and only if the weights of multi-player coalitions are weakly decreasing with respect to coalition inclusion. Weighted nucleoli possessing the NPO-property can be characterized by means of a multiplicative formula for the weights of the multi-player coalitions and a restrictive condition on the weights of one-player coalitions.

Keywords: Cooperative; games; ·; weighted; nucleoli; ·; null; player; ·; Kohlberg; condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-17
Note: Received: March 1997/Final version: November 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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