Weighted weak semivalues

Emilio Calvo Ramón (emilio.calvo@uv.es) and Juan Carlos Santos (carlos.santos@ehu.es)

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 9 pages

Abstract: We introduce two new value solutions: weak semivalues and weighted weak semivalues. They are subfamilies of probabilistic values, and they appear by adding the axioms of balanced contributions and weighted balanced contributions respectively. We show that the effect of the introduction of these axioms is the appearance of consistency in the beliefs of players about the game.

Keywords: Probabilistic values; semivalues; weighted Shapley values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-15
Note: Received: March 1998/revised version: October 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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