Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study

Nick Feltovich and John Duffy

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 1, 152 pages

Abstract: This paper presents experimental results from an analysis of two similar games, the repeated ultimatum game and the repeated best-shot game. The experiment examines whether the amount and content of information given to players affects the evolution of play in the two games. In one experimental treatment, subjects in both games observe not only their own actions and payoffs, but also those of one randomly chosen pair of players in the just-completed round of play. In the other treatment, subjects in both games observe only their own actions and payoffs. We present evidence suggesting that observation of other players' actions and payoffs may affect the evolution of play relative to the case of no observation.

Keywords: Social; learning; ·; observation; ·; reinforcement; ·; ultimatum; game; ·; best-shot; game; ·; information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-11
Note: Received February 1996/Final version April 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)

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Working Paper: Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study (1997)
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