Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games

Vincent Vannetelbosch and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 1, 53-68

Abstract: There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way "best responses against small perturbations" are defined. It is shown that applying the spirit of these definitions to rationalizability leads to three different refinements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, respectively. We prove that weakly perfect rationalizability is weaker than both perfect and proper (Schuhmacher, 1995) rationalizability and in two-player games it is weaker than trembling-hand perfect rationalizability. By means of examples, it is shown that no other relationships can be found.

Keywords: Rationalizability; ·; refinements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-11
Note: Received: January 1997/final version: August 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/9028001/90280053.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games (1999)
Working Paper: Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games (1997)
Working Paper: Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games (1997)
Working Paper: Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:53-68

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().