The multichoice consistent value
Esther GutiÊrrez (),
Emilio Calvo () and
Juan Carlos Santos ()
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Esther GutiÊrrez: Departamento de Economi´a Aplicada I, Universidad del Pai´s Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 2, 177-188
We consider multichoice NTU games, i.e., cooperative NTU games in which players can participate in the game with several levels of activity. For these games, we define and characterize axiomatically the multichoice consistent value, which is a generalization of the consistent NTU value for NTU games and of the multichoice value for multichoice TU games. Moreover, we show that this value coincides with the consistent NTU value of a replicated NTU game and we provide a probabilistic interpretation.
Keywords: NTU; games; ·; consistent; NTU; value; ·; multichoice; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Received: May 1998/Final version: January 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:177-188
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