Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game

Claudia Keser () and Roy Gardner
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Claudia Keser: Institut für Statistik und mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Zirkel 2, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 252 pages

Abstract: This paper describes the results of an experiment applying the strategy method to analyze the behavior of subjects in an 8-player common pool resource (CPR) game. The CPR game consists of a constituent game played for 20 periods. The CPR game has a unique optimum and a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; the latter involves overinvestment in the appropriation from the CPR. Sixteen students, all experienced in game theory, were recruited to play the CPR game over the course of 6 weeks. In the first phase of the experiment, they played the CPR game on-line 3 times. In the second phase of the experiment, the tournament phase, they designed strategies which were then played against each other. At the aggregate level, subgame perfect equilibrium organizes the data fairly well. At the individual level, however, fewer than 5% of subjects play in accordance with the game equilibrium prediction.

Keywords: Strategy; method; ·; common; pool; resources; ·; Nash; equilibrium; ·; bounded; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-17
Note: Received May 1994/Final version August 1996
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Working Paper: Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game (1994)
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