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Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining

Vijay Krishna and Roberto Serrano ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1995, vol. 24, issue 3, 259-72

Abstract: We study the set of subgame perfect equilibria associated with the "n"-person noncooperative bargaining mechanism proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1992). Our results pertain to transferable utility games. The set of perfect equilibria depends on the parameter representing the "continuation probability," [rho]. For general TU games, we characterize the set of payoffs from perfect equilibria for (1) small values of [rho]; and (2) large values of [rho]. For symmetric games a complete characterization for all values of [rho] is provided.

Date: 1995
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Related works:
Working Paper: Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining (1993)
Working Paper: Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining (1993)
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International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

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