The Nucleolus for Cooperative Games with Arbitrary Bounds of Individual Rationality

Arkady Sobolev

International Journal of Game Theory, 1995, vol. 24, issue 1, 13-22

Abstract: We consider cooperative games with a given bound for individual rationality. We introduce the nucleolus with respect to the set of preimputations satisfying the newly defined bounds of rationality. An axiomatization of this nucleolus is given.

Date: 1995
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