Games and Cooperation Indices

Rafel Amer and Francesc Carreras

International Journal of Game Theory, 1995, vol. 24, issue 3, 239-58

Abstract: We provide a model for quantitatively restricted cooperation. It leads to a modification of both game and the Shapley value whose properties are studied, giving rise to an axiomatic characterisation. An individually rational extension of the Myerson value is included, as well as a description of several former restriction methods that are shown to be generalized by our model.

Date: 1995
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