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The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments

Mamoru Kaneko () and Myrna Wooders

International Journal of Game Theory, 1996, vol. 25, issue 2, 245-58

Abstract: We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions--ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality--are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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