Two-Person Game Forms Guaranteeing the Stability against Commitment and Delaying Tactics

Nikolai Kukushkin ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1995, vol. 24, issue 1, 37-48

Abstract: The notions of the struggle for leadership or for followership, introduced by H. Moulin for two-person games, are considered for game forms. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a game form never to generate a game with the struggle of either kind are derived. Connections between these properties and the existence of a Nash equilibrium for any preference profile as well as the possibility to select a Nash equilibrium in an incentive compatible way are established.

Date: 1995
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