The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms

Bezalel Peleg and Stef Tijs

International Journal of Game Theory, 1996, vol. 25, issue 1, 13-34

Abstract: We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. We also indicate how to generalize our results to Bayesian and extensive games.

Date: 1996
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Related works:
Working Paper: The consistency principle for games in strategic form (1996)
Working Paper: The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form (1993)
Working Paper: The consistency principle for games in strategic form (1993)
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