On the relationship between p-dominance and stochastic stability in network games

Daniel Opolot

International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, vol. 51, issue 2, No 3, 307-351

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the properties of networks that determine the uniqueness of long-run equilibria emerging from symmetric coordination games when players are myopic best responders. We identify the contagion threshold and the network diameter as two measures of finite networks that determine when strategies in the minimal p-best response set of a coordination game are uniquely stochastically stable. We show that when the contagion threshold is greater or equal to p, strategies in the minimal p-best response set are uniquely stochastically stable in strongly connected networks with diameter greater or equal to seven. The contagion threshold and the network diameter are easy to compute and their values are unique for every strongly connected network.

Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Stochastic stability; Networks; p-best response set; Contagion threshold (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00794-w

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