Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information

Chirantan Ganguly () and Indrajit Ray ()
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Chirantan Ganguly: Queen’s University Belfast

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 4, No 2, 957-992

Abstract: Abstract We consider a version of the Battle of the Sexes with private information and allow cheap talk regarding the players’ types before the game. We show that a desirable type-coordination property is achieved at the unique fully revealing symmetric equilibrium (when it exists). Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium that exists when the fully revealing equilibrium does not. We further prove that truthfully revealed messages, followed by actions that depend meaningfully on these messages, are not equilibrium profiles with one-sided cheap talk. Finally, fully revealing equilibria do not exist under sequential communication either.

Keywords: Battle of the sexes; Revelation of information; Cheap talk; Symmetric equilibrium; Truthfulness; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information (2017)
Working Paper: Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0

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