Asymmetric majority pillage games

Manfred Kerber (), Colin Rowat and Naoki Yoshihara ()
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Manfred Kerber: University of Birmingham
Colin Rowat: University of Birmingham

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 4, No 4, 1009-1035

Abstract: Abstract We study pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131(1):26–44, 2006), which model unstructured power contests. To enable empirical tests of pillage game theory, we relax a symmetry assumption that agents’ intrinsic contributions to a coalition’s power is identical. We characterise the core for all n. In the three-agent game: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set’s existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.

Keywords: Power contests; Core; Stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2023)
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Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2019)
Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00859-y

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