Asymmetric majority pillage games

Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat and Naoki Yoshihara ()

No 701, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper studies pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26-44, 2006, “Pillage and property”), which are well suited to modelling unstructured power contests. To enable empirical test of pillage games’ predictions, it relaxes a symmetry assumption that agents’ intrinsic contributions to a coalition’s power is identical. In the three-agent game studied: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set’s existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.

Keywords: power contests; core; stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/30864/DP701.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2023)
Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2023)
Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2022)
Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:701

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hiromichi Miyake ().