Asymmetric majority pillage games

Manfred Kerber (), Colin Rowat and Naoki Yoshihara ()
Additional contact information
Manfred Kerber: University of Birmingham
Colin Rowat: University of Birmingham

No SDES-2023-3, Working Papers from Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management

Abstract: We study pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26–44, 2006, “Pillage and property†), which model unstructured power contests. To enable empirical tests of pillage game theory, we relax a symmetry assumption that agents’ intrinsic contributions to a coalition’s power is identical. We characterise the core for all n. In the three-agent game: (i) only eight configurations are possible for the core, which contains at most six allocations; (ii) for each core configuration, the stable set is either unique or fails to exist; (iii) the linear power function creates a tension between a stable set’s existence and the interiority of its allocations, so that only special cases contain strictly interior allocations. Our analysis suggests that non-linear power functions may offer better empirical tests of pillage game theory.

Keywords: power contests; core; stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2023-05, Revised 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in SDE Series, May 2023, pages 1-31

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http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2023-3.pdf First version, 2023 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2023)
Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2022)
Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2019)
Working Paper: Asymmetric majority pillage games (2019)
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