Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games

Makoto Shimoji

International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, vol. 51, issue 3, No 1, 481 pages

Abstract: Abstract Originating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590–2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers’ best-responses, the sender’s rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single linear programming problem.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Multiple receivers; Heterogeneous beliefs; Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00800-1

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