Intervention with limited information

Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine ()
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David K. Levine: EUI

International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, vol. 51, issue 2, No 5, 379-389

Abstract: Abstract We study how optimal interventions in response to a shock with limited information depend on the complexity of the system. We show that as the complexity of the system grows, the optimal intervention shrinks to zero.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; High dimensional optimization; Limited information; Le Chatelier Principle; Status quo bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00796-8

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