The equal collective gains value in cooperative games

Emilio Calvo Ramón () and Esther Gutiérrez-López ()
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Esther Gutiérrez-López: Universidad del País Vasco U.P.V./E.H.U.

International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, vol. 51, issue 1, No 9, 249-278

Abstract: Abstract The property of equal collective gains means that each player should obtain the same benefit from the cooperation of the other players in the game. We show that this property jointly with efficiency characterize a new solution, called the equal collective gains value (ECG-value). We introduce a new class of games, the average productivity games, for which the ECG-value is an imputation. For a better understanding of the new value, we also provide four alternative characterizations of it, and a negotiation model that supports it in subgame perfect equilibrium.

Keywords: Shapley value; ENSC-value; Reciprocity; Equal collective gains; Balanced collective contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00791-z

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