Additive adjudication of conflicting claims

Jaume García-Segarra () and Miguel Ginés-Vilar ()
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Jaume García-Segarra: University of Cologne
Miguel Ginés-Vilar: University Jaume I of Castellón

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 1, No 4, 93-116

Abstract: Abstract In a “claims problem” (O’Neill 1982), a group of individuals have claims on a resource but its endowment is not sufficient to honour all of the claims. We examine the following question: If a claims problem can be decomposed into smaller claims problems, can the solutions of these smaller problems be added to obtain the solution of the original problem? A natural condition for this decomposition is that the solution to each of the smaller problems is non-degenerate, assigning positive awards to each claimant. We identify the only consistent and endowment monotonic adjudication rules satisfying this property; they are generalizations of the canonical “constrained equal losses rule” sorting claimants into priority classes and distributing the amount available to each class using a weighted constrained equal losses rule. The constrained equal losses rule is the only symmetric rule in this family of rules.

Keywords: Constrained equal losses rule; Consistency; Claims problem; D70; D63; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00811-6

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