Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality

Joseph Halpern () and Yoram Moses ()
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Yoram Moses: Technion-Israel Institute of Technology

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 2, No 7, 457-473

Abstract: Abstract Characterizations of Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and rationalizability in terms of common knowledge of rationality are well known. Analogous characterizations of sequential equilibrium, (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium, and quasi-perfect equilibrium in n-player games are obtained here, using earlier results of Halpern characterizing these solution concepts using non-Archimedean fields.

Keywords: Characterizing solution concepts; Common knowledge of rationality; Sequential equilibrium; Perfect equilibrium; Quasi-perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0535-9

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