Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty

Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 1, No 3, 29-49

Abstract: Abstract We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty in which types are assigned to agents either with or without replacement. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the ‘name’ but not the ‘type’ of their potential partners. In this context, learning occurs via matching and using Bayes’ rule. We introduce the notion of a stable and consistent outcome, and show how the interaction between blocking and learning behavior shapes the existence of paths to stability in each of these two uncertainty environments. Existence of stable and consistent outcomes then follows as a side result.

Keywords: Consistent outcomes; Paths to stability; Uncertainty; Two-sided matchings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D71 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-015-0519-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0519-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0519-1

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().