EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set

Lukáš Adam () and Tomáš Kroupa ()
Additional contact information
Lukáš Adam: Czech Academy of Sciences
Tomáš Kroupa: Università degli Studi di Milano

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 4, No 1, 918 pages

Abstract: Abstract We introduce the intermediate set as an interpolating solution concept between the core and the Weber set of a coalitional game. The new solution is defined as the limiting superdifferential of the Lovász extension and thus it completes the hierarchy of variational objects used to represent the core (Fréchet superdifferential) and the Weber set (Clarke superdifferential). It is shown that the intermediate set is a non-convex solution containing the Pareto optimal payoff vectors that depend on some chain of coalitions and marginal coalitional contributions with respect to the chain. A detailed comparison between the intermediate set and other set-valued solutions is provided. We compute the exact form of intermediate set for all games and provide its simplified characterization for the simple games and the glove game.

Keywords: Coalitional game; Limiting superdifferential; Intermediate set; Core; Weber set; 91A12; 49J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-016-0557-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0557-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0557-3

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0557-3