Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Heng Liu ()
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Heng Liu: University of Michigan

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 4, No 8, 1037-1069

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies n-player $$(n\ge 3)$$ ( n ≥ 3 ) undiscounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. We prove that all uniform communication equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game can be obtained as Nash equilibrium payoffs of the game extended by unmediated cheap talk. We also show that all uniform communication equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game can be reached as Nash equilibrium payoffs of the game extended by a pre-play correlation device and a cheap-talk procedure that only involves public messages; furthermore, in the case of imperfect public and deterministic signals, no cheap talk is conducted on the equilibrium path.

Keywords: Repeated games; Cheap talk; Correlation; Mediated communication; Imperfect monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0569-7

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