Essential stability of $$\alpha $$ α -core

Zhe Yang ()
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Zhe Yang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 1, No 2, 13-28

Abstract: Abstract Using the existence results in Kajii (J Econ Theory 56:194–205, 1992), we identify a class of n-person noncooperative games containing a dense residual subset of games whose cooperative equilibria are all essential. Moreover, we show that every game in this collection possesses an essential component of the $$\alpha $$ α -core by proving the connectivity of minimal essential subsets of the $$\alpha $$ α -core.

Keywords: Cooperative equilibrium; $$\alpha $$ α -core; Essential point; Essential component (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0515-5

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