Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities

Mehmet Karakaya and Bettina Klaus ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 2, No 6, 435-455

Abstract: Abstract We consider hedonic coalition formation games with variable sets of agents and extend the properties competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity (introduced by Klaus, Games Econ Behav 72:172–186, 2011, for roommate markets) to hedonic coalition formation games. Then, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, the Core is characterized by coalitional unanimity and Maskin monotonicity (see also Takamiya, Maskin monotonic coalition formation rules respecting group rights. Niigata University, Mimeo, 2010, Theorem 1). Next, we characterize the Core for solvable hedonic coalition formation games by unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and either competition sensitivity or resource sensitivity (Corollary 2). Finally, and in contrast to roommate markets, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, there exists a solution not equal to the Core that satisfies coalitional unanimity, consistency, competition sensitivity, and resource sensitivity (Example 2).

Keywords: Coalitional unanimity; Competition sensitivity; Consistency; Core; Hedonic coalition formation; Maskin monotonicity; Resource sensitivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im)Possibilities (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0533-y

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