Hedonic Coalition Formation Games with Variable Populations: Core Characterizations and (Im)Possibilities

Mehmet Karakaya and Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: We consider hedonic coalition formation games with variable sets of agents and extend the properties competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity (introduced by Klaus, 2011, for roomate markets) to hedonic coalition formation games. Then, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, the Core is characterized by coalitional unanimity and Maskin monotonicity (see also Takamiya, 2010, Theorem 1). Next, we characterize the Core for solvable hedonic coalition formation games by unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and either competition sensitivity or resource sensitivity (Corollary 2). Finally, and in contrast to roommate markets, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, there exists a solution not equal to the Core that satisfies coalitional unanimity, consistency, competition sensitivity, and resource sensitivity (Example 2).

Keywords: Coalitional Unanimity; Competition Sensitivity; Consistency; Core; Hedonic Coalition Formation; Maskin Monotonicity; Resource Sensitivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pp.
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:15.01

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