On the drawbacks of large committees

Volker Hahn

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 2, No 13, 563-582

Abstract: Abstract This paper aims at identifying possible drawbacks of large committees. I present a model of a committee of experts with career concerns where each expert may observe an argument about the state of the world but be unsure about the argument’s soundness. Experts may remain silent or decide to be the first to announce an argument. In contrast with the existing literature, I focus on the possibility that experts may discover duplicate information. I show that experts become more reluctant to speak in larger committees as a result. This effect can be sufficiently strong to make small groups of experts optimal.

Keywords: Experts; Committees; Career concerns; Verifiable information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0546-6

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