Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

Ezra Einy (), Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ori Haimanko (), Ram Orzach () and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
Ezra Einy: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Mridu Prabal Goswami: Indian Statistical Institute
Ram Orzach: Oakland University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 1, No 5, 79-102

Abstract: Abstract We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante asymmetric information represented by finite connected partitions of the set of states of nature. Our focus is on a family of such auctions in which no player has an information advantage over his opponent. We find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium with monotone strategies, and show that such an equilibrium is unique. We further show that the ex-ante distribution of equilibrium effort is the same for every player (and hence the players’ expected efforts are equal), although their expected payoffs are different and they do not have the same ex-ante probability of winning.

Keywords: Common-value all-pay auctions; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: COMMON-VALUE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION (2013)
Working Paper: Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0524-4

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