COMMON-VALUE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Ezra Einy (), Ori Haimanko (), Ram Orzach () and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
Ezra Einy: BGU
Ram Orzach: Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309, USA

No 1306, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante asymmetric information represented by finite partitions of the set of possible values of winning. We consider two families of such auctions: in the first, one of the players has an information advantage (henceforth, IA) over his opponent, and in the second, no player has an IA over his opponent. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium in auctions with IA and explicitly characterize it; for auctions without IA we find a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium in monotonic strategies. We further show that, with or without IA, the ex-ante distribution of equilibrium effort is the same for every player (and hence the players' expected efforts are equal), although their expected payoffs are different. In auctions with IA, the players have the same ex-ante probability of winning, which is not the case in auctions without IA.

Keywords: Common-value all-pay auctions; asymmetric information; information advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1306.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information (2017)
Working Paper: Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:1306

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Aamer Abu-Qarn ().