The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

Jonathan Newton

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 2, No 14, 583-589

Abstract: Abstract Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of Alger and Weibull (Econometrica 81:2269–2302 2013) on the evolution of stable other-regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.

Keywords: Evolution; Moral values; Assortative matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0548-4

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