The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity

Jonathan Newton

No 2014-14, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: Differing degrees of assortativity in matching can be expected to have both genetic and cultural determinants. When assortativity is subject to evolution, the main result of of Alger and Weibull (2013) on the evolution of stable other regarding preferences does not hold. Instead, both non-Nash and Pareto inefficient behavior are evolutionarily unstable.

Keywords: evolution; moral values; assortative matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity (2017)
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