Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

Edward Cartwright and Anna Stepanova ()
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Anna Stepanova: University of Kent
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Cartwright

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 4, No 13, 1163-1191

Abstract: Abstract We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.

Keywords: Public good; Threshold; Impulse balance theory; Quantal response; Forced contribution; Ordinal potential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0570-1

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