Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
Edward Cartwright () and
Anna Stepanova ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Cartwright
Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent
We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.
Keywords: Public good; threshold; impulse balance theory; quantal response; forced contribution; ordinal potential (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1506
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