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Scarcity, competition, and value

André Casajus () and Harald Wiese
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André Casajus: HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Harald Wiese: Universität Leipzig

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 2, No 1, 295-310

Abstract: Abstract We suggest a value for finite coalitional games with transferable utility that are enriched by non-negative weights for the players. In contrast to other weighted values, players stand for types of agents and weights are intended to represent the population sizes of these types. Therefore, weights do not only affect individual payoffs but also the joint payoff. Two principles guide the behavior of this value. Scarcity: the generation of worth is restricted by the scarcest type. Competition: only scarce types are rewarded. We find that the types’ payoffs for this value coincide with the payoffs assigned by the Mertens value to their type populations in an associated infinite game.

Keywords: TU game; Shapley value; Lovász extension; Strong monotonicity; Partnership; Vector measure game; Mertens value; 91A12; 91A13; 91B15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0536-8

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