A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel

Chih Chang () and Cheng-Cheng Hu ()
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Chih Chang: National Tsing Hua University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, vol. 46, issue 1, No 10, 185-204

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of the paper is to propose a bargaining game to interpret the kernel non-cooperatively. Based on the idea of the Davis-Maschler reduced game, a bilateral bargaining procedure is provided in our game model. We show that the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of our non-cooperative game coincides with the kernel for transferable utility games.

Keywords: Bargaining game; Kernel; Nash program; Subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0529-7

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